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ABSTRACT 
Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus:  
Why the Economy cannot be Divorced from its Governance 
by Stergios Skaperdas * 
The Homo economicus of traditional economics is far from being completely 
self-interested, rational, or as individualistic as he is purported to be; he will 
haggle to death over price but will not take what he wants by force. Implicitly, he 
is assumed to behave ruthlessly within a well-defined bubble of sainthood. 
Based on a simple model, I first examine what occurs when this assumption is 
relaxed and genuine, amoral Homines economici interact. Productivity can be 
inversely related to compensation; a longer shadow of the future can intensify 
conflict; and, more competition among providers of protection reduces welfare. 
The patently inefficient outcomes that follow call for restraining self-interest, for 
finding ways to govern markets. I then review some of the different ways of 
creating restraints, from the traditional social contract, to the hierarchical 
domination of kings and lords, to modern forms of governance. Checks and 
balances, wider representation, the bureaucratic form of organization, and other 
ingredients of modern governance can partly be thought of as providing 
restraints to the dark side of self-interest. Though highly imperfect, these 
restraints are better than the alternative, which typically involves autocratic, 
amateurish, and corrupt rule. Then, thinking of most problems in terms of a 
first-best economic model is practically and scientifically misguided.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Beschränkung des genuinen Homo Economicus: Warum 
wirtschaftliche Prozesse und Governancestrukturen untrennbar sind  
Der Homo Economicus der klassischen Wirtschaftswissenschaften ist dadurch 
gekennzeichnet, dass er zwar bis in den Tod um Preise feilscht, sich aber 
niemals Dinge mit Gewalt aneignen würde. So betrachtet ist er nicht in jeder 
Hinsicht vollständig eigennützig und rational oder individualistisch. Diese 
Eigenschaften treffen nur auf eine Dimension seines Verhaltens zu, nämlich auf 
sein Verhalten im Marktgeschehen. In Hinblick auf das Respektieren von 
Eigentumsrechten verhält sich der Homo Economicus geradezu wie ein 
Heiliger. Basierend auf einer einfachen Analyse wird in der Arbeit untersucht, 
welche Konsequenzen die Lockerung dieser Annahme hat. Die Interaktion 
solcher nunmehr wirklich eigennütziger Homines Economici hat verschiedene 
Implikationen. Beispielsweise kann eine besonders hohe Produktivität eines 
Akteurs dazu führen, dass er eine besonders niedrige Entlohnung erhält. Auch 
kann die Möglichkeit zukünftiger Verhandlungen Konflikte in der Gegenwart 
verschärfen. Ferner wird ein stärkerer Wettbewerb zwischen Akteuren, die den 
Schutz von Eigentumsrechten anderer als Dienstleistung anbieten, die Wohl-
fahrt senken. Solche Ineffizienzen können dazu führen, dass es allokations-
politisch sinnvoll ist, den Eigennutz zu zügeln und Märkte zu regulieren. In der 
Arbeit werden verschiedene Möglichkeiten geprüft, solche Beschränkungen zu 
schaffen, vom traditionellen Gesellschaftsvertrag über die hierarchische Herr-
schaft von Königen und Adligen, bis hin zu modernen Regierungsformen. 
Checks and Balances, die umfassende Repräsentation, die bürokratische 
Organisationsform und andere Elemente des modernen Regierens können 
teilweise für Beschränkungen der "dunklen Seite" des Eigennutzes sorgen. 
Obwohl solche Formen der Beschränkung nicht sehr wirkungsvoll sind, sind sie 
gegenüber ihren Alternativen überlegen, die typischerweise mit autokratischer, 
amateurhafter und korrupter Herrschaft einhergehen. 
1 Introduction
For at least a century economists have persistently tried to divorce the study
of the economy from the study of its governance. Initially, the sharp division
- signi…ed by renaming ”political economy” into the more scienti…c-sounding
”economics” - was undertaken just for analytical purposes. The world is
complicated, it was argued, and by separating the economic from the political
and the social we can analyze it better. Someone of course would have to
put things together, but it was unclear who would. In the end, it is political
scientists, sociologists, and public policy analysts who have been considering
the interaction between the economic and the political. For long stretches of
economic thought in the meantime, interventions in the economy could only
be represented as distortions of an otherwise e¢cient economic Nirvana.
Dissenting voices of course were always there. More recently those of
North (1990) and Olson (1996, 2000) have been prominent ones, and the re-
cent experience of post-Soviet states in acquiring free-wheeling ma…as instead
of free markets provides prima facie evidence of the di¢culties in separat-
ing economics from politics. However, even the strongest evidence will have
di¢culty dislodging prevailing theories and approaches unless it is replaced
by theories that can subsume the existing ones.1 Whereas no such general
theory exists at the moment, there is a body of research within economics
developed over that past decade or so that holds promise and on which this
paper is based.
I will …rst argue that self-interested behavior has a dark side that needs to
be controlled for successful economic performance to take place. This point
is perhaps too obvious to even be made for most readers, yet it has been as-
sumed away in both modeling and empirical research in much of economics
and therefore it needs to be emphasized and expressed in the modeling lan-
guage of modern economics. Human beings do not just make a living by
producing; they can also engage in non-productive activities that appropri-
1While reading Mancur Olson’s last book (Olson, 2000), I was continually thinking
about the possible reactions of my perhaps less sympathetic colleagues. As laymen they
would tend to agree with most individual points, but as economists they would have di¢-
culty …tting the pieces within the economic framework they are accustomed to. Ultimately,
they would feel uncomfortable about the wholesale revision that evidently the received ap-
proach would require. That the assumption of unrestrained self-interest logically leads to
the need to consider economics as not separate from politics was also argued by Bowles
and Gintis (1993).
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ate the production of others. Employees within organizations spend time
in‡uencing their bosses instead of working; managers of corporations can en-
rich themselves instead of promoting the interests of their supposed bosses,
the shareholders, stakeholders, or voters; individuals and …rms lobby for
subsidies, reduced taxes, and favorable legislation; and, individual, groups,
and countries arm themselves to defend or take away the production of oth-
ers. When these appropriative activities are taken into account within an
economic model, in addition to the loss of e¢ciency, the distributional out-
comes are very di¤erent from those that would emerge when appropriation
is not considered. Instead of the more productive receiving higher compen-
sation, they can receive less than the less productive who have an advantage
in appropriation. Then, the incentives for innovation and productive capital
accumulation would also be very di¤erent when appropriation is considered.
Although appropriation cannot be completely eliminated, how it is man-
aged has dramatic economic consequences. Appropriation occurs in war of
all against all, in despotic and highly extractive rule, and in modern national
states in which the contests formerly taking place in the battle…eld are now
taking place in the political arena and the courts, but obviously its e¤ects in
these three environments are very di¤erent. I therefore next review some of
the ways the dark side of self interest can be constrained.2
The response that has received much attention in economics and rational-
choice social science over the past two decades is based on the ”folk theo-
rem” and the importance of the ”shadow of the future.” I argue that the
understanding that can come from this approach has been overrated. The
underlying equilibria are non-robust, a longer shadow of the future in con-
‡ict situations can actually make things worse, and typically applications of
the approach essentially abstract from the particular institutions that they
study.
The provision of security and protection against the most egregious ex-
amples of appropriation has been the main ingredient in many de…nitions
of the state. I consider then how precisely can the state provide restraints
against appropriation. One candidate state is the autocratic or proprietary
one, headed by a ruler with few restraints in his power, a ”stationary bandit,”
to use Mancur Olson’s evocative term (Olson, 1991). In reviewing the small
2I do not touch upon the recent literature on social capital (see, eg, Putnam, 2000)
which argues for the importance of social restraints on the the dark side of self-interest.
What examine is the relevance of governance, of the importance of political restraints.
2
economics literature on the subject, however, I conclude that the conditions
under which an autocratic ruler with a vested interest in severely reducing
appropriation is limited. For a ruler is a big bandit who has correspondingly
higher extractive powers than small-time bandits have. The control of the
appropriative powers of autocratic rulers, then, can be a bigger problem than
the control of simple banditry and robbery. It is under those conditions that
government can be said to become the problem and not the solution.
Modern governance, however, with the patchwork of checks and bal-
ances, wider representation, professional bureaucracies, and loyalty to na-
tional states has managed, I argue, to overcome some of the most damaging
aspects of appropriation and con‡ict. Fighting in the battle…eld has been
supplanted in most cases by …ghting in courts and the halls of parliament.
Appropriation has taken new forms and does not imply anything close to
Nirvana e¢ciency, but that is not the relevant measure of comparison. The
arbitrary and amateurish governance of absolutism that has prevailed for al-
most all of history and which still prevails in much of the globe is the more
appropriate measure of comparison. For the most pressing problems in devel-
oping and transitioning economies as well as for many economic questions in
the industrialized world, I conclude that it would be scienti…cally misguided
to assume a world free of the appropriative activities that are examined here.
2 On the Received Approach
To illustrate the basic problem I begin with the simple textbook model of
exchange. Consider two individuals – call then Robinson (R) and Xena
(X) – who value two material goods, say …sh (f) and coconuts (c). Suppose
Robinson holds an endowment eR that can only be converted one-for-one into
…sh, whereas Xena holds an endowment eX that she can similarly convert
one-to-one into coconuts.3 Consumption fi of …sh and ci of coconuts by
i = R;X induces utility U(fi; ci); which, for reasons of exposition later, we
assume to be linearly homogeneous.
One of the fundamental problems of modern economics, …rst formulated
in a familiar form by Edgeworth (1881), is the problem of exchange between
the likes of Robinson and Xena. What is the most reasonable process by
3The complete specialization assumed here could be derived from the Ricardian model
of trade whereby the two individuals can produce both goods but they endogenously choose
to specialize, one in the production of …sh and the other in the production of coconuts.
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which the two sides will arrive at an exchange of some of Robinson’s …sh for
some of Xena’s coconuts? What determines these exchange ratios or prices?
Are there conditions under which prices will be close to those that would
prevail under perfect competition? Much brainpower has been expended on
such questions over more than a century, with some questions being more
important than others at di¤erent times.4
Regardless of the approach taken in this setting, however, there is a ten-
dency for outcomes to have the property that goods that are more valued to
have higher prices, and those who hold such goods to receive higher incomes
and utility. For instance, under competitive pricing, the …nal utility received
by Robinson can be shown to equal eR
@U(eR;eX)
@f and the utility received by
Xena is eX
@U(eR;eX)
@c : Suppose eR = eX = E: Then, the person who would
receive higher utility would also be Robinson if and only if @U(E;E)@f >
@U(E;E)
@c .
That is the person who, other things being equal, holds the endowment that
contributes higher marginal utility also would receive higher compensation.
Moreover, such a property does not hold just for the case of exchange and
utility. The simple problem of exchange we are discussing is analytically
isomorphic to the basic problem of production, whereby the endowments of
Robinson and Xena are inputs used in the production of a …nal consump-
tion good by a means of a production function that has the same properties
that the utility function has. Under such a production interpretation of the
model, the more marginally productive person would have a higher wage rate
and, other things equal, would also receive higher utility.5
There’s a caveat, however, to the whole approach. What would prevent
Xena – who is a warrior princess – from just using some coconuts to bang
Robinson’s head and take away all the …sh from him? Then, if Robinson were
to take that into consideration, he would have to take appropriate counter-
measures by shifting his production to defensive goods or other goods that
are less easily appropriable by Xena. The caveat is too obvious and has
4For example, the study of the bargaining problem was virtually abandoned between
the 1950s and the early 1980s, when Rubinstein’s (1982) approach along with developments
in game theory revived interest in the problem. During the intervening years, implicitly if
not explicitly trading at competitive equilibrium prices was the standard assumption both
in modeling and empirical research.
5With more general utility and production functions or with di¤erent ways of deter-
mining exchange, de…ning contribution to marginal utility or productivity are not as clear
cut, but we would be hard pressed to …nd cases in which those who contribute more to
utlity or more to production receive less compensation.
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been too important historically, and continues to be important today, for
Edgeworth to have ignored it as the following statement shows:
The …rst principle of economics is that every agent is actuated
only by self-interest. The workings of this principle may be viewed
under two aspects, according as the agent acts without or with,
the consent of others a¤ected by his actions. In wide senses, the
…rst species of action may be called war; the second, contract.
Edgeworth (1881, pp.16,17)
Though perhaps ”war” in this quote appears to be of a rather benign
nature, still Edgeworth did not pursue the matter further. Subsequent au-
thors did not even feel the need to introduce a caveat or acknowledge the
assumption of near-sainthood of the homo economicus of modern economics.
A notable exception was Haavelmo (1954) who introduced a framework that
allows for both production and appropriation, and discussed implications
of such a setting for economic development. Haavelmo’s work in this area
was almost completely ignored, though he received the Nobel prize for his
research in econometrics.6 It is only recently that the big caveat has been
reintroduced, to which we now turn.
3 Robinson versus Xena
To allow for the possibility of grabbing and defending, suppose that Robinson
and Xena can allocate part of their endowment to arming so that
eR = f + gR (1)
eX = c+ gX
where gi (i = R;X) denotes ”guns” and f and c, given the specialization
of Robinson in the former and of Xena in the latter, are the total quantities of
…sh and coconuts produced. Note, then, that contrary to the neoclassical case
6Schelling (1960) was another exception that stimulated interest on the economic anal-
ysis of con‡ict and had much impact on the development of game theory more than twenty
years after its publication. Its emphasis, however, was more on the ”economics of con-
‡ict” rather than studying the e¤ect of ”con‡ict on the economy,” which was Haavelmo’s
emphasis and the main topic of this article.
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of the previous section the number of …sh and coconuts is variable. Given
the assumption of linear homogeneity of the utility function that implies
transferable utility, total utility U(f; c) = U(eR ¡ gR; eX ¡ gX) is variable as
well.7 The more guns the two sides choose, the lower is the level of useful
production and of total utility.
Guns are used to determine distribution. The two sides could …ght it out
and whoever turns out to be the winner would take possession and consume
all of the …sh and coconuts. Another possibility would be for the two sides
to exchange some coconuts for some …sh under the threat of …ghting it out.
In such a case guns would determine the bargaining power of each side. Let
p(gR; gX) denote Robinson’s probability of winning in the event of a …ght,
with 1 ¡ p(gR; gX) = p(gX ; gR) being Xena’s probability of winning; that is,
the probability of winning is symmetric. Naturally, it is assumed that the
probability of winning of each side is increasing in its own quantity of guns
and decreasing in the opponent’s quantity of guns.8 Again, because of the
linear homogeneity of the utility function it can be shown that the two sides
would be indi¤erent between …ghting and Robinson receiving a p(gR; gX)
share of …sh, coconuts, and total utility with Xena receiving the remainder.
Risk aversion, diminishing returns, destruction due to …ghting, or additional
resources needed to be devoted to …ghting all would imply a greater set of
peaceful alternatives, but the …ndings that follow do not qualitatively depend
on exactly how the surplus over …ghting is determined. Then, whether the
two sides …ght or settle peacefully under the threat of con‡ict, taking account
the constraints in (1), the payo¤ functions are as follows:
V R(gR; gX) = p(gR; gX)U(eR ¡ gR; eX ¡ gX) (2)
V X(gR; gX) = (1 ¡ p(gR; gX))U(eR ¡ gR; eX ¡ gX) (3)
7The model examined here is similar to those in Hirshleifer (1988), Skaperdas (1992),
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997), and Neary (1997). Esteban and Ray (1999) are exam-
ining some e¤ects of unequal distribution and polarization. For some other recent work
on the economics of con‡ict, see the introduction by Sandler (2000).
8Two functional forms of p(gR; gX) that are employed in the literature are
gmR
gmR +g
m
X
(m >
0) and e
kgR
ekgR+ekgX (k > 0): The former functional form has been extensively employed in
the rent-seeking literature, with Tullock (1980) being the …rst to use it (with m = 1).
Hirhsleifer (1989) has explored the properties of both functional forms, whereas Skaperdas
(1996) has axiomatized them as well as a wider class of functions.
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An increase in one side’s guns increases the share of total utility received
but decreases the production of consumables, …sh in the case of Robinson
and coconuts in Xena’s case. This tradeo¤ appears when we take the partial
derivative of each side’s payo¤ with respect to own guns:
@V R(gR; gX)
@gR
=
@p(gR; gX)
@gR
U(eR ¡ gR; eX ¡ gX) ¡ p(gR; gX)@U(eR ¡ gR; eX ¡ gX)@f
(4)
@V X(gR; gX)
@gX
= ¡@p(gR; gX)
@gX
U(eR ¡ gR; eX ¡ gX) ¡ (1 ¡ p(gR; gX))@U(eR ¡ gR; eX ¡ gX)@c
(5)
The …rst term in each of the two derivatives represents the marginal
bene…t of a small extra unit of guns whereas the second term represents the
marginal cost of guns. Note how the second component of the marginal cost
of guns is the marginal utility of the good produced by that side. Thus the
higher the marginal contribution of one side, the higher is its marginal cost
of guns. As we shall see shortly this property has signi…cant implications for
the pattern of distribution. A unique Nash equilibrium (g¤R; g¤X) can be shown
to exist under mild conditions.9 An interior equilibrium is characterized by
setting (4) and (5) equal to 0. By doing that it can be shown that
@p(g¤R;g¤X)
@gR
¡@p(g¤R;g¤X)@gX
1 ¡ p(g¤R; g¤X)
p(g¤R; g¤X)
=
@U(eR¡g¤R;eX¡g¤X)
@f
@U(eR¡g¤R;eX¡g¤X)
@c
(6)
Under the same conditions that ensure existence of equilibrium, the left-
hand-side of this equation can be shown to be greater than 1 if and only
if p(g¤R; g¤X) < 1=2 or if and only if g¤R < g¤X : Then, say, for Xena to be
more powerful and receive the larger share of the total pie (g¤R < g¤X); by
9For existence, it is su¢cient that the contest success function p(¢; ¢) is not too con-
vex in its …rst argument (
@2p(gR;gX)
@g2x
@p(gR;gX )
@gx
<
@p(gR;gX)
@gx
p(gR;gX)
): For uniqueness, it is su¢cient that
p(gR; gX) =
f(gR)
f(gR)+f(gX)
for some positive and increasing function f(¢_). Proofs can be
found in Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997).
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(6) we must have @U(eR¡g
¤
R;eX¡g¤X)
@f >
@U(eR¡g¤R;eX¡g¤X)
@c ; or that Xena must be
less marginally productive at the equilibrium point. To facilitate comparison
with the simple exchange model of the previous section, let eR = eX = E: It
can then also be shown that Xena is more powerful if and if only if @U(E;E)@f >
@U(E;E)
@c :
10 Note that this is the exact opposite outcome from the case of
completely secure property rights that we discussed earlier. When property
is insecure, the side that is more productive has a comparative disadvantage
in grabbing and, in equilibrium, it prefers to contribute relatively more to
production and relatively less to guns which in turn results in lower welfare
than its opponent. The less productive side has a comparative advantage
in grabbing as it faces a lower opportunity cost of guns (in terms of useful
production) and receives a bigger part of the total pie.
We do not have to go far back in history to …nd evidence of the rela-
tionship between productivity and power. It appears that warriors, knights,
lords and generally specialists in violence appeared to have enjoyed higher
consumption than the peasants who were the actual producers and over which
those specialists ruled. Further, many long-distance merchants and traders
like the colonizing Phoenicians and Ancient Greeks, Genovese, Venetians,
Vikings or the …rst Arabs who spearheaded the spread of Islam, were all
primarily superior warriors and only secondarily could they be considered
traders.
Of course, the possibly inverse relationship between productivity and
power is just a tendency that is not absolute. Someone who is better compen-
sated could have the absolute advantage in production as well. But allowing
for appropriation casts serious doubt on the presumption that those who are
better compensated are also necessarily more productive, a presumption that
appears widespread in empirical assessments of relative worth. Moreover, re-
gardless of absolute advantage, the dynamic incentives created by the possible
static disadvantage that higher productivity confers can be seemingly per-
verse. As Gonzalez (2001) shows, even superior technologies that available at
zero cost could be easily rejected in favor of inferior technologies that would
not provide the strategic disadvantage of the superior technologies. The wa-
ter mill for example had been used by the …rst century AD in the Roman
world but was not generally adopted until the eleventh century. Similar fates
had befallen numerous other innovations from the classical world as well as
10For the proof, see Skaperdas (1992). For additional comparative static results of a
more general model, see Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997).
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China (see Baumol, 1990, for examples and arguments).
Another obvious di¤erence from the received economic model of exchange
concerns the costs of arming and con‡ict themselves.11 These costs can be
both static and dynamic. In growth models that allow for appropriation,
either as non-durable output (Grossman and Kim, 1996, Mehlum et. al.,
2000) or as durable non-productive ’enforcive’ capital (Lee and Skaperdas,
1998), its growth-stunting e¤ects become compounded over time. If we were
to brie‡y re‡ect on the types of capital and large-scale organizations that
most human societies had created up to about two centuries ago, we can
easily see that it had been heavily weighed towards the appropriative type;
protective walls, castles and moats, elaborate siege machines. No civilian
equivalent could approach the organizational and logistical sophistication of
many armies.
More concretely, Hess and Pelz (2002) have recently attempted to put
a lower bound on the direct welfare costs of con‡ict. For countries like
Guatemala and Ethiopia they estimate these costs to range from 13 to 44 per-
cent of their consumption (Hess and Pelz, 2002, Table 4). These costs dwarf
the potential gains from eliminating business cycles, as calculated in Lucas
(1987). Other recent work shows how con‡ict impinges on economic growth
(Rodrik, 1998) and the quantitative e¤ects and sources of civil wars (Collier
and Hoe-er, 2000, Reynal-Querol, 2002, and the survey by Sambanis, 2001).
And from a longer term perspective, the twentieth century, the century with
the most accelerated change, has also seen the highest estimated per capita
numbers of deaths than any other century for which we have reasonable es-
timates (Mazower, 1998). Based on such evidence we would normally expect
as much attention being given to the issue of domestic and international
con‡ict, especially in developing countries, as it is given to the problem of
business cycles in macroeconomics. Moreover, the estimates by Hess and
Pelz are truly lower bounds. They do not include the cost of defense and
other security expenditures that can vary enormously across countries with
otherwise the same characteristics except for the level of internal or external
11I have not distinguished here the conditions under which actual con‡ict occurs versus
those that settlement under the threat of con‡ict takes place. Incomplete information is
obviously one possible reason for parties engaging in actual con‡ict despite its additional
costs (for formal models on this point, see Brito and Intriligator, 1985, and Bester and
Warneryd, 2000). Actual con‡ict can also occur without incomplete information because
of the compounding rewards to the winner of a con‡ict, a point that we will discuss in the
next section.
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security they face. And they do not also include the aforementioned long-run
dynamic e¤ects of capital accumulation and technology adoption.
Up to this point we have maintained that appropriative expenditures and
other associated costs are literally due to arming. There are however numer-
ous other forms of appropriative activities that are important and are very
di¤erent from arming. Whether private or public, almost all organizations
are not organized as markets but as bureaucracies. At least some activities
within bureaucracies can be considered to be in‡uence activities which have
been modelled in a broadly similar fashion to the model described above (see,
e.g., Milgrom, 1988, or Mueller and Warneryd, 2001). The problem of the
con‡ict between shareholders and managers is of course very old and at least
one part of Russia’s dismal economic performance during the 1990s, where
asset-stripping and outright stealing of productive assets in the face of weak
legislation and enforcement have been rampant.12 Other activities that can
be, at least partly, considered appropriative include litigation expenditures
(Farmer and Pecorino, 1999, Hirshleifer and Osborne, 2001) and of course
lobbying, ’corruption,’ and rent seeking.
How much of such activities can be considered unproductive or non-
productive and therefore in some need of control and governance is not a
priori clear. However, the point is not where precisely to draw the line but
the need to look more closely to the vast world of non-market activities;
to begin recognizing that the governance of those activities takes a signif-
icant portion of human resources; and that we cannot keep assuming that
all these activities are simply deviations or distortions of an ideal world of
costless market interactions in which everybody behaves as a saint, except
when they need to haggle over price.
We next turn to a necessarily brief overview of some ways that economists
have considered as restraining the dark side of self interest.
12For a survey of the many problems that can emerge in corporate governance, see
Shleifer and Vishny (1998). For examples from Russia, see Blasi et. al. (1997) or
Klebnikov (2000).
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4 On the Traditional Response: The Folk The-
orem and the Social Contract
Prominent economists and classical liberal philosophers from Adam Smith
to Hayek and Buchanan have always been aware of the importance of both
moral constraints and respect for the law on the part individuals in a modern
economy and society. However, to my perhaps limited knowledge, that atti-
tude is considered necessary on normative grounds, not derived as part of the
equilibrium behavior of self-interested agents. (See, for example, Part II of
Hayek, 1960, or Buchanan, 1977.) Filling this apparent hole, then, has been
the subject of a wide-ranging e¤ort on the part of economists, game theorists,
and rational-choice political scientists over the part twenty …ve years or so.
The main argument is based on the repeated interaction of individual
agents using the ”folk theorem” (see, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991, Chapter 5, for the generic game-theoretic approach and to Greif, Bates,
and Singh, 2000, and Muthoo, 2000, for applications to problems similar to
the ones examined here). When the future is highly valued, parties can con-
dition future cooperation on present cooperation and therefore cooperative
equilibria can exist in which no guns, or at least fewer guns, are produced
and all parties are better o¤ than they would be under one-time interactions.
Thus, when the ”shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 1984) is long enough, Xena
and Robinson could be better o¤ that they are under the (g¤R; g¤X) equilibrium
we discussed earlier.
Repeated interactions and the shadow of the future can increase, and
have undoubtedly increased in certain instances in the past, the chances of
cooperation from the case of tribal societies to those of feuding modern elites.
Their importance, however, for the emergence and evolution of governance
has been overemphasized. Arguments based on the folk theorem can only
be used to establish the possibility of cooperation. The con‡ictual equilib-
rium is always an equilibrium and in many respects it is the most robust
one: the strategies that implement it are computationally less complex, they
are renegotiation-proof, and it can be argued that they are more focal than
the typical multitude of supergame strategies. Even if a cooperative equi-
librium were to emerge, as argued in more detail in the next section, in
many instances the ”contract” that can be expected to emerge would not be
Rousseau’s horizontal one but more like a Hobbesian vertical contract.13
13The characterization of contracts employed here has been used by Hirshleifer (1995,
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Furthermore, a longer shadow of the future, instead of increasing the
chance of cooperation, could actually aggravate con‡ict and even induce it.
Think of Xena and Robinson, isolated in an island with …xed resources, and
having to interact over time. Perhaps they would indeed decide and disarm,
but what about the possibility of …ghting it out to the end, so that only one
is left on the island who will thereafter enjoy all its fruits without having
to share them with the other? That is, despite the costliness of arming
and con‡ict, when rewards to winning spill into the future, the adversaries
could …ght much harder, and the longer the shadow of the future is the more
intense arming and …ghting can become.14 Much ethnic con‡ict, for example,
could be attributed to the apparent intense desire key participants have for a
certain piece of land belonging to the future generations of their kind, to the
extent that they are willing to sacri…ce their own lives. Likewise, arguments
of the ”falling-domino” variety, regardless of whether they are right, are based
precisely on acute concern and high valuation of future outcomes.
To illustrate how con‡ict can be induced by a longer shadow of the future
consider an example in which we distinguish between con‡ict and settlement
under the threat of con‡ict. Suppose that Robinson and Xena care not just
about what occurs today but also about what will occur tomorrow; that is,
we can think of the game as having two periods. For simplicity assume in
each period there is an economic surplus of T units to be allocated between
the two adversaries and that guns in each period are …xed at levels G^R and
G^X for Robinson and Xena: If the two parties were to …ght it out some of the
surplus T would be destroyed and only ®T (® 2 (0; 1)) would be left for the
winner. Therefore, looking at every period in isolation, the two parties would
always be better o¤ dividing the surplus in accordance with their winning
probabilities than …ghting it out. Given guns and the associated probabilities
of winning, p^ and 1 ¡ p^ , Robinson and Xena can either …ght or settle: In a
particular period if they were to settle, Robinson would receive p^T and Xena
(1 ¡ p^)T: If they were to …ght, Robinson would have an expected payo¤ of
p^®T and Xena would have an expected payo¤ of (1 ¡ p^)®T: This preference
for settlement, however, does not necessarily hold when the two sides take
2001)
14Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996) show how such time-dependence increases arming as
the discount factor increases. Gar…nkel and Skaperdas (2000) distinguish between actual
con‡ict and settlement under the threat of con‡ict, and show how actual con‡ict becomes
more likely as the discount factor increases. The example below is based on the argument
of the second paper.
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account the e¤ect of the future.
Consider now the decision between …ghting and settling today, after the
two sides have armed, and taking account the e¤ect of tomorrow. For sim-
plicity suppose that if they were to …ght today, the loser would be eliminated
and the winner could enjoy all the surplus by himself or herself tomorrow and
do that without having to incur the cost of arming. Letting ± 2 (0; 1) denote
the discount factor for tomorrow, Robinson’s payo¤ from settlement - which
would also imply settlement tomorrow as well - would be p^T + ±(p^T ¡ G^R).
Similarly, the settlement payo¤ for Xena would be ((1¡p^)T+±((1¡p^)T¡G^X):
The expected payo¤s from …ghting, again as of today, would be p^®T + ±p^T
and (1 ¡ p^)®T + ±(1 ¡ p^)T . It is simple to show that the two sides will
settle if and only if ± · minf p^(1¡®)T
G^R
; (1¡p^)(1¡®)T
G^X
g:15 That is, the two sides
compromise when they do not value the future highly enough and …ght when
they value the future more highly, the exact opposite of what occurs under
folk theorem arguments. Higher discount factors would also induce higher
equilibrium levels of guns, if guns were allowed to be endogenously deter-
mined. The key to such outcomes is the inability of the contending parties
to make long-term commitments on guns.
Overall, the argument that repeated interactions and high values placed in
the future will by themselves solve the fundamental problem of restraining the
dark side of self interest is unsustainable both theoretically and empirically.
Otherwise, they would be no need for laws, courts, constitutions, treaties,
contracts, enforcement agencies, and all the institutions and organizations
of governance, for individual agents could do without them if they just had
long enough time horizons.
5 Hierarchies, Kings, and Lords
For the overwhelming part of human history and still for much of the world
today, autocracy has been the main form of governance. It would be hard
to imagine how this outcome could emerge out of the repeated prisoners’-
dilemma stories that are often been told as parables for the emergence of
state organization. However, the emergence of hierarchy and autocracy can
15If p = GR=(GR + GX), then the equilibrium choices of guns for both sides can be
shown to equal ®T=4 and the critical discount factor would equal 2(1 ¡ ®)=®: Thus the
less destructive con‡ict is, the higher is the critical discount factor below which settlement
ensues.
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make sense within the simple model of Robinson and Xena we have examined.
One element we can use is the basic asymmetry in productive capacities,
and thus in power, that exists between the two adversaries. If anything, in
considering dynamic versions of such interactions, any initial asymmetries
are likely to be compounded over time with the more powerful adversary
becoming stronger.16 The two sides, then, could save some resources by
agreeing on an asymmetric, hierarchical contract in which the more powerful
agent is recognized as such, as lord, and has a larger claim on the surplus;
the lord and his subject can then expend only a fraction of the resources in
guns that are expended under one-time interaction.
To make a more nuanced evaluation of autocracies however we need to
consider more dedicated models, which we will discuss shortly. The provision
of security – from providing protection against common crime to managing
con‡ict among organized interests – can be considered the de…ning charac-
teristic of the state, for the other functions that states may undertake cannot
be ful…lled without security. The problem with states, especially autocratic
ones, however, is that they can hardly be considered disinterested in pro-
viding security. If those who control the means of violence can pacify their
territories, what prevents them from taking away whatever they can from
their subjects? Or, to put it di¤erently in the more familiar question, who
is going to guard the guardians? This is the fundamental problem of gov-
ernance which in its various manifestations – not just in government but
in private bureaucracies as well – arguably poses the biggest challenge to
economic performance.
5.1 Monopolistic Autocracy17
Olson (1991) and somewhat more emphatically McGuire and Olson (1996)
have argued that a ”stationary bandit,” a king or lord who has a reasonable
expectation of maintaining his position for some time, can actually have the
16A more detailed description and discussion of such a model can be found in Skaperdas
and Syropoulos, 1995, pp. 70-74). For a connection to the work on hierarchy and authority
in the other social sciences, see Zambrano (1999).
17An alternative name for the type of state I discuss here is the ”proprietary” state, the
state that is run for the bene…t of their rulers and their circles. To my knowledge, the
term has been used …rst by Grossman and Noh (1994). It should be dinstiguished from
the term ”predatory” (see, eg, Robinson, 1997), in the sense that all proprietary states
need not be predatory.
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incentives to provide a measure of good governance.18 The stationary bandit,
as the proprietor of the state, provides protection against bandits and robbers
using a more e¢cient technology of protection that can be provided privately
by each individual producer.19 Because collective protection can be provided
more e¢ciently and fewer resources are needed to provide the same level of
protection as under a hypothetical anarchy, output should in principle be
higher under autocracy than under anarchy. That also implies that more
security can be bought with a smaller fraction of the population resorting to
banditry and robbery. Higher security can in turn induce the ruler to provide
the more traditional infrastructural public goods and stimulate trade and
economic development. With a longer time horizon, the pro…t-maximizing
proprietor could lower tribute so that he can stimulate these economic forces
even further.
What is a necessary condition, however, for a pro…t-maximizing ruler
to follow non-extortionary taxation and growth-promoting expenditures on
public goods is a high degree of certainty that he will be around in the future
to reap the rewards of such policies. Since the internal and external chal-
lengers to the power and pro…ts of autocrats typically abound, their position
can be precarious. Those who have been in power the longest could even
be the most paranoid about the future – as Wintrobe (1998, p.39) argues,
paranoia is the characteristic personality trait of dictators. The optimal pol-
icy of the ruler could then well be the extraction of maximal revenue for the
short term. Because the ruler can have greater extractive powers than sim-
ple bandits have or because not enough protection is provided by the ruler,
producers could be even worse o¤ than under anarchy. (See Moselle and
Polak, 2001, and Konrad and Skaperdas, 1999, for formal models that allow
18A number of articles by economists have examined the problem during the past decade
or so. To my knowledge, Findlay (1990) was the …rst to specify a model of the autocratic
state within an optimizing framework. Besides McGuire and Olson (1996), others include
Grossman and Noh (1994), Hirshleifer (1995), Marcouiller and Young (1995), Skaperdas
and Syropoulos (1995), Robinson (1997), Konrad (1999), Konrad and Skaperdas (1999),
and Moselle and Polak (2001). Wintrobe (1998) has engaged in an in-depth examination
of dictatorships, as he considers the many di¤erent control problems that dictatoships
typically face. Usher (1989) has developed an elaborate model of anarchy out of which
autocracies may emerge.
19McGuire and Olson (1996), as well as Findlay (1990) and others, model the services
provided by the state as an ordinary public good, without any explicit reference to the pro-
vision of security. The interpretation discussed here follows that of Konrad and Skaperdas
(1999).
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for such possibilities, and Marcouiller and Young, 1995, for a model similar
to McGuire and Olson’s but which can also lead to a disastrous ”black-hole-
of-graft” outcome.)
The presence of a long horizon that comes from a low uncertainty of fu-
ture rule by a ruler with an ”encompassing interest,” though, is by no means
su¢cient for following growth-promoting policies. For, as Robinson (1997)
has argued, many such policies can be at the expense of autocratic rule in
the long run. Promoting trade implies that merchants becomes richer and
perhaps ask for more rights and a share of power; expanding education can
make more of the population become conscious of its subservient status and
demand reforms and a change in the status quo; even building roads can
make it easier for rebels to reach the capital and drive out the ruler.20 Thus,
long-term survival may well be incompatible with providing the infrastruc-
ture public goods that are necessary for development. Robinson’s (1997,
pp. 23-26) review of the evidence on dictatorships suggests that those with
dynastic pretensions and therefore longer horizons have been the most preda-
tory during the twentieth century. Similarly, the dynastic empires of Spain,
Russia, or Ancien Regime France were very slow to adopt growth-promoting
policies compared to the other more liberal regimes in Europe and, from the
eighteenth century onward, compared to the emerging national states.
Overall, then, there is no theoretically or empirically convincing case to
be made that a for-pro…t, proprietary state will necessarily bring an improve-
ment in the material welfare of its subjects. After all, up to less than two
centuries ago there were virtually no other types of states and their contribu-
tion to material growth had been at best questionable. However, one factor
that has been argued to have taken some of the rough edges o¤ autocracies in
the West and have very gradually (and, grudgingly, on the part of rulers) led
to the developmental policies is competition among such states (e.g., North
and Thomas, 1973).
20I cannot resist reproducing the following statement (quoted in Robinson, 1997, p.2) by
former President of Zaire Mobuto Sese Seko to President Juvenal Habyarintha of Rwanda:
”I told you not to build any roads... Bulding roads never did any good.. I’ve been in power
in Zaire for thirty years and I never built one road. Now they are driving down them
to get you.” Of course, President Mobuto was following the same policies of the former
masters of Congo, the Kings of Belgium and especially King Leopold.
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5.2 Competing Autocracies
Extrapolating from competition in ordinary economic markets we could ex-
pect that competition in the provision of protection and security would also
be bene…cial. The typical argument runs as follows: Rulers who maximize
the di¤erence between tax revenue and the cost of services provided will of-
fer lower taxes and a higher service level, the more rulers there are around.
This is because the customers/subjects will tend to be attracted to the rulers
with the best combination of tax rates and services. For this type of com-
petition to work, there are two necessary conditions. First, the movement
of subjects across states should be of low enough cost. Second, each ruler
can commit to their announced tax rates and service provisions - for, other-
wise, subjects who are lured in a state face the threat of expropriation once
they have chosen their location and have become producers there. If rulers
cannot commit, then taxation is determined by the relative power of the two
sides: the brute strength of the ruler versus the tax-resistance capabilities of
the subjects. Failure of either condition – mobility of subjects or the ruler’s
ability to commit – cannot guarantee that tax competition among autocratic
states will bring about the bene…cial outcomes of competition expected in
ordinary economic markets.
However, in much of history competition among proprietary rulers ap-
pears to have been much less like competition among mineral water produc-
ers and more akin to competition among ma…a lords. Ma…osi compete less
on the prices they charge for protection and more through …ghting for, and
protecting, their turf. Likewise, rulers have typically worried much more
about the armies of their competitors across their borders than about how
the …scal policies of their competitors a¤ect the movement of their subjects.
Indeed, autocratic states had to devote most of their resources to defend-
ing their territories, with the tributary subjects within them, and …ghting
against other states. Because those resources expended on arming and …ght-
ing are kept away from production and consumption, such competition has
very di¤erent e¤ects from those of price competition. For other things equal,
greater competition – in the sense of having a greater number of states –
implies that a greater amount of resources is expended on con‡ict, which can
in turn create greater uncertainty for the fate of the rulers themselves and
for the production and investment decisions of the subject populations. Such
warlord competition can be worse than atomized anarchy and can be char-
acterized as a higher level of organized anarchy. (For a model of this type
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of competition and its e¤ects, see Konrad and Skaperdas, 1999. In Azam
(2002), though warlords are taken to maximize the welfare of their group
and not strictly their own take, the e¤ects can be still be pretty dismal.)
Which type of competition has been most important? The former type
of economic competition among autocratic rulers is virtually the sole form of
competition really considered but has most likely been overrated. If it were
the main form of competition among rulers, even in the West, the world
would have developed materially a long time ago. Autocratic rulers can
behave di¤erently, though, when they do not face just other autocratic rulers
but are under the pressure of economic competition from less autocratic
regimes. They can then be forced to provide tax and other privileges. This
is the force – the pressure from city states in Italy and the Nertherlands,
and from England whose rulers had more restrictions in their power – that
Tilly (1992) has identi…ed as those that operated in the West and which
gradually induced more economic forms of competition. Autocratic rulers,
left by themselves, …nd more pro…table to just …ght one another for territory
and the tributary subjects that come with it.
Even today, this …ghting-for-rents competition is not con…ned to ma…as
and gangs. Former President Mobutu Sese Seko certainly was not afraid
that his subjects would ‡ee to the greener pastures of other states, although
some of them undoubtedly did, and policies of his successors do not appear
any di¤erent. If anything, from Colombia to many other areas of Africa, to
Afghanistan, and many post-Soviet republics, that competition for rents by
rulers threatens to become even more important in the medium run.
Overall, though autocratic rule can increase security and help provide
other public goods, it often recreates the problems of con‡ict in anarchy at a
higher and more organized level. Autocrats can extract more e¢ciently from
producers than simple bandits can and …ghting among such rulers moves
the problem of restraining self-interest from individuals to organizations and
groups. The political experimentation of the past two centuries, though
rather new to assess especially in terms of long-term viability, appears to
have been e¤ective in providing at least some answers to the fundamental
problem of governance.
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6 Restraints in Modern Governance
Over the past two centuries the tremendous expansion of markets has been
primarily of the variety that Olson (2000, Chapter 10) has labelled socially
contrived markets (as opposed to self ¡ enforcing ones). In these markets,
individual participants face potential enforcement problems and other pre-
requisites that are much more complex than those faced by our example of
Robinson and Xena. Take for instance the market for real-estate mortgages.
To begin with, the owner of the land and other structures needs to have clear
title, something that requires well-de…ned laws, courts that will enforce them,
land registries and other government agencies that oversee zoning and related
land regulations, reliable insurance that will cover many contingencies, and
every step along the way has to be free of corruption. These attributes might
appear to Western eyes easy to satisfy, but they are expensive to set up and
di¢cult to institute in practice. For example, in Russia only recently legis-
lation was voted on the private ownership of land in cities and still no such
laws exist for land in rural areas. Clear title is just a prerequisite. The obli-
gations of the lender and borrower, bankruptcy laws and their enforcement,
various asymmetries of information are typically even more complex than
clarity of title. To have the secondary mortgage market that exists in the
United States, another set of complex conditions needs to be satis…ed.
Underpinning all the above is a very high degree of con…dence on the
part of all market participants that none of the contractual terms, the basic
laws, and their enforcement will change during the life of the loan. That is,
market participants need to have high con…dence that whoever is in power
cannot change much that concerns them. It is di¢cult to see how an autocrat
with few restraints could inspire enough con…dence so that markets such as
today’s mortgage markets could evolve.
In the West, modern governance evolved out of Absolutism, with a patch-
work of restraints, piecemeal extensions of the franchise and other rights, and
civil service reorganizations gradually and haltingly introduced. Its main
characteristics include checks and balances, separation of powers, formal rep-
resentation, bureaucratic form of organization, as well as the loyalty of the
citizens of national states. I will next argue that these characteristics can,
at least partly, be seen as ways of restraining the dark side of self-interest
of individuals, organizations, and rulers. My presentation will necessarily be
selective, tentative, and speculative at times since economists have done so
little work in the area. It therefore also represents somewhat of an agenda
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for future research.
6.1 Representation, Checks and Balances
Representative government and checks and balances have often began with
restraints on the power of rulers that have come about after protracted civil
wars. According to North and Weingast (1989) it took almost the whole
seventeenth century in England for the Parliament (consisting of nobles) to
develop just the beginnings of an e¤ective and lasting check on the powers of
the Crown. This check on the power of the Crown and transfer of con‡icts
from the battle…eld to the political and judicial arenas were according to
North and Weingast critical for the subsequent developments in England and
in the wider area of Northwestern Europe. However, the process of con‡ict
and settlement that took place in seventeenth century England was by no
means unique in Europe (or beyond it), and it took various other forms.
Earlier, for example, in twelfth century Genoa, after decades of unresolved
civil wars the feuding clans agreed on the institution of the podesta, an
outsider noble who served for a limited term of one year as administrator
and judge but who had enforcement powers limited enough to safeguard
against takeover in alliance with one of the clans (See Greif, 1998). Other
Italian cities in late Medieval times developed locally adapted institutions of
con‡ict management that were part of the institutional stock of knowledge
that could be used in the subsequent centuries.
The English Crown did not cede some of its power out of the goodness of
their Kings’ hearts. Many of the developments in modern governance over
the past two centuries that have bene…ted wider segments of the population
– the extension of the democratic franchise, land reforms, labor legislation,
welfare programs – could be interpreted to have emerged under pressure
as con‡ict-alleviating devices. Land reform can be a rational response of
landowners who can be better o¤ by giving up some of their land which in
turn induces considerably less con‡ict and banditry (Horowitz, 1993, Gross-
man, 1994). Employment subsidies can similarly be instruments of con‡ict
resolution (Zak, 1995, Grossman, 1995). Generically, Rajan and Zingales
(2000) have shown that in variations of the basic model of section 3 one side
can bring about a Pareto improvement by voluntarily transferring ex ante
(that is, before the choices of guns are made) some of its initial resources to
the other side. However, the range of parameter values over which such ex
ante transfers are Pareto-improving can be narrow or non-existent, and even
20
if they are not the savings from reduced con‡ict are small compared to the
gains that can be brought about by more drastic con‡ict-reducing measures.
Such a drastic measure is implementing transition to a new regime with
rulers that are very di¤erent. Rosendor¤ (2001) argues that the transition
from apartheid in South Africa was engineered by a cost-bene…t calculation
on the part of the white ruling elite there. Rosendor¤ models apartheid as
a con‡ictual regime with the type of ine¢ciencies we have examined in this
paper, whereas under democracy, as the median voter is poor (and mostly
black), there is redistribution from the rich (and mostly white) to the poor.
Under circumstances that Rosendor¤ argues were about those prevailing in
South Africa around transition time, the losses that the rich whites would
incur under democracy were deemed to be lower than those due to con‡ict,
thereby precipitating transition from apartheid.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) make a similar argument about the ex-
tension of the democratic franchise in Britain during the nineteenth century,
albeit using a dynamic model that takes account of an additional possibility:
the fact that the ruling elites could have possibly replicated the economic
outcome of democracy through systematic transfers and without extending
democracy. However, as Acemoglu and Robinson argue, such transfers are
not as credible as those that would come about if the poor were to hold a
share of power. That is, extending the democratic franchise represents a level
of commitment which, in a changing environment, cannot be credibly repli-
cated by a stream of transfers that are not accompanied by a fundamental
change in the rules of the game.
The relative social peace that has followed the extension of the democratic
franchise and the variations of the welfare state that are to be found in the
developed world appear to have contributed to the political stability that
is a prerequisite for modern markets and which, in turn, further fuelled the
material growth of the second part of the twentieth century.
6.2 Bureaucracy
New democracies, however, have their own problems of con‡ict. When a
party attains power it often views government as its …efdom, ready to be
exploited just as it was by its former autocratic proprietors. Government
positions are sta¤ed by loyal supporters regardless of their quali…cations and
the positions are used for private gain; government contracts and loans are
doled out to individuals and …rms within the party’s fold; and the power of
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government is used to weaken political opponents. All this can be perfectly
legal as the legal framework is undeveloped. In the meantime, rent-seeking
and corruption take place at all levels and actual, bloody con‡ict can easily
take place between government and opposition. The behavior and economic
e¤ects of such governments can be more rapacious and short-sighted than
those of many dictators. And these are not problems con…ned to banana
republics. The now developed national states of the West have also gone
through similar phases during their histories (e.g., Johnson and Libecap,
1994, for the corrupt functioning of the United States civil service in the
nineteenth century).
The way Western national states have attempted to tackle these prob-
lems and continue to do so can be characterized as attempts to limiting the
discretion of government o¢cials and agencies. At the higher echelons this is
accomplished through systems of checks and balances between the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government. At the lower levels, discre-
tion is limited through the professionalization of the bureaucracy and the
creation of laws, rules, and procedures that attempt to patch the inevitable
holes that are created by the evolving economy and society. Bureaucracy
becomes professionalized by providing civil servants with security of employ-
ment that does not depend on which party is in power, salaries that are
adequate to deter corruption for most, and a professional ethic and culture
that insulates civil servants for everyday political struggles. Milgrom (1988)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) have modelled in‡uence activities within
organizations and shown how the limiting of discretion, equity in compensa-
tion, and other procedures that seem ine¢cient in a market environment can
be e¢ciency enhancing within organizations. Similarly, using the approach
of Warneryd (1998), it can be shown that having more than one level of
hierarchy in in‡uence activities and rent-seeking can increase e¢ciency.21
The ideal disinterested bureaucracy has seldom been attained, of course,
and it has many problems of its own, especially when all laws and rules are
being applied ”by the book.” However the relevant comparisons should not
be with an unattainable ideal but with the more probable alternative – found
21Max Weber’s (1978) classic essay on bureaucracy can still be read with pro…t, whereas
Wilson (1989) o¤ers an excellent survey of the functioning of bureaucracies. Arguments
complementary to those being made here have also been advanced using a traditional
principal-agent approach (see Tirole, 1994, and Dixit, 1996). Using such an approach,
multi-tasking and measurement di¢culties lead to the adoption of the low-powered incen-
tives that are typically observed inside bureaucracies.
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in the West’s past and in the present of much of the rest of the world – of
arbitrary, amateur, and frequently corrupt political control of the levers of
government.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the bureaucratic form of organiza-
tion became the dominant form of organization for private …rms as well. Bu-
reaucratization came hand-in-hand with the rise of the corporation as chron-
icled in Chandler (1977). Though the recent incomplete-contracts approach
to the theory of the …rm has emphasized the role of relationship-speci…c
investments (Grossman and Hart, 1986), the control of some appropriative
activities through the market may well be more di¢cult than through hi-
erarchies. For example, much of trade across countries, which involves a
greater degree of contractual insecurity than trade within countries, is in-
tra…rm trade.22
6.3 Homogeneity and the National State
Industrialization and the tremendous expansion of markets over the past two
centuries have been accompanied by a new type of state, the national state.23
We have already discussed some of its central characteristics, but another im-
portant one has been the striving of these types of states to homogenize the
culture and language, and to gain the loyalty of the peoples within them. Be-
fore the advent of national states in Europe, the main form of governance was
the absolutist empire. Peoples within them were from di¤erent ethnicities,
spoke di¤erent languages, and adhered to di¤erent cultural practices. Their
primary loyalty was to their own community and the identi…cation with,
and loyalty to, the state was essentially non-existent. In the largely static,
agrarian world of the times such diversity appeared to function satisfactorily.
Expanding markets, the factory system, increased worker mobility, and
the rise of bureaucracy all implied that people from very di¤erent back-
grounds had to come in contact with one another and cooperate in numbers
that were historically unprecedented. To communicate with your co-workers
in the factory ‡oor and, even more importantly, for the expanding bureau-
cracy to function e¤ectively, having a common language of communication
22In the late 90s over 50 percent of US and Japanese trade was intra…rm trade (Gilpin,
2001, p.210).
23Another name that has been used is the ”nation-state.” For the variety of types of
states in history, see Finer (1997) or Mann (1986). For a perspective on the rise of the
national state, see Tilly (1992); its main competitor was the absolutist empire.
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certainly would help. Beyond language, adherence to social and cultural
norms that were not just those of the former peasants’ village facilitated co-
operation in the emerging greater society. Public education and the striving
towards universal literacy contributed not just this industrial social organiza-
tion, but also to the loyalty of citizens towards the state in ways that many
of them were willing to sacri…ce their lives in war. This is, very brie‡y,
Gellner’s (1983) ”one state, one culture” theory of the national state. (For
an economist’s perspective of some other aspects of Gellner’s approach, see
Findlay, 1995.) Gellner’s theory can be thought of as a hypothesis of the
homogenization of L (Labor) so that it can enter the production function
F (K;L). The linguistic and cultural homogeneity that developed in the most
successful national states along with the loyalty of their citizens facilitated
the cooperation in factory ‡oors, markets, and politics, and thus reduced the
older forms of appropriation within these states. Of course, the same very
strong forces of cooperation within national states also made possible the
horrendously destructive wars of the …rst part of the twentieth century. Still,
though, the forces unleashed by national states have been considered to be
bene…cial on balance and the experience of the second part of the twenti-
eth century indicates that some learning has taken place about controlling
con‡ict at the transnational level.24
Overall, my purpose in this section has been to present some ideas that
have already appeared within economics or other disciplines that hold promise
for understanding how modern governance relates to the economy. This way
the correlation of the tremendous growth of the state alongside capitalism
and markets that has occurred over the past two centuries can begin making
sense. Otherwise, if we were to follow received economic theory literally and
consider government either as a disinterested provider of public goods or as
an aberration, we will have trouble making sense of the past two centuries.
24Economists have recently considered the age-old problems of the e¤ects of democracy
and trade on con‡ict. For a bene…cial e¤ect of democracy on con‡ict see Gar…nkel (1994)
and for a more skeptical view see Hess and Orphanides (2001). For the e¤ect of trade on
con‡ict that incorporates both the classical liberal and realist perpsectives, see Findlay
and Amin (2000) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001).
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7 Concluding Remarks
Imagine the U.S. stock markets without a Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion or its equivalent, without the elaborate insider trading rules that have
evolved to reduce cheating by managers, without accounting standards and
other regulation. Could we rely on the goodwill of each …rm’s managers to
produce accurate accounting of their pro…ts, not selling to their friends and
relatives at prices below market and using their o¢ce in the myriad other
ways that are possible for private enrichment? Perhaps, in the absence of any
government involvement and despite the many contrary experiences in the
rest of the world, the interested parties could come together and self-regulate
in an e¤ective fashion. Whether that could occur or not, however, the is-
sue is that cheating by managers is an important real world problem that is
also a relevant scienti…c problem for the economist. I have argued that the
costs associated with restraining self-interest and its control are large and
they deserve much more attention than they have received within economics.
Highly paid managers, accountants, lawyers, and less well-paid regulators
and secretaries are all involved in the business of engaging in or controlling
the dark side of self interest. So are policemen, gangbangers, ma…osi, judges,
spies, diplomats, and army generals. The costs of these activities represent
a large share of national incomes,25 and the relevant inputs can hardly be
modelled as entering ordinary production functions; as shown in this paper,
when some of this activity is modelled as appropriation central results of
received theory are overturned.
Yet both modeling and, most importantly, the explicit or implicit norma-
tive analyses of many economists and economic policymakers is based on an
ideal world without costly appropriation or measures that attempt its con-
trol. Although they might recognize that such activities play a role in the
economy, their analyses is based on the framework that has been elaborated
since the time of Edgeworth and which does not explicitly allow for appropri-
ation. Frameworks of analysis and ideas have an independent existence and
can shape the world powerfully. To repeat the Keynes’ often-quoted remarks:
... [T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when
25For estimates of the transaction sector of the US economy, which includes many of
the enforcement and other costs examined in this paper, see Wallis and North (1986).
Marselian (1998) has examined the cross-country relationship of di¤erent parts of these
costs and macroeconomic variables.
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they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than
is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from
any intellectual in‡uences, are usually the slaves of some defunct
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years
back.
Keynes, 1964[1936], p. 383.
Nowadays, practical men, if not madmen in authority, in many govern-
ments and international organizations have a world-view that is encapsulated
in the received …rst-best model of section 2 in which there is no dark side
to self interest. The primary criterion of evaluation in that model and that
worldview is a narrow notion of economic e¢ciency that abstracts away from
the direct and indirect costs of con‡ict and appropriation. That cannot go,
and has not gone, very far in understanding the sources of economic perfor-
mance in the modern world. The recent research in economics that I have
partially reviewed here is a promising start. Thus, if we were to agree with
Keynes, who immediately after the passage quoted above wrote ”I am sure
the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual
encroachment of ideas” (p.383), we could be optimistic. However, the fact
that ideas of a truly integrated politico-economic model and a correspond-
ingly wider notion of e¢ciency have not progressed that much over more than
a century of economic thought might give us pause and think that the power
of vested interests could be more important than Keynes believed them to
be.
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